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West Europe Report

(FOUO 33/81)



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POLITICAL

FRANCE

GISCARD'S FORMER POLICIES, MITTERRAND'S NEW DIRECTIONS REVIEWED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 20 May 81 pp 30-33

[Article--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Mitterrand as candidate already had an Africa policy worthy of Mitterrand as president. In our last issue we summarized his party's proposals for changing the relationship between France and Africa. These proposals are not only a counterweight to the policies Giscard has followed the last 7 years. They flow from an analysis of what Africa today means to itself, and how it relates to external intervention. In this issue we publish, as an exclusive, this document which serves as the basis of the Africa policy called for by the PSF.

The first key idea: the rejection of any claim that Africa is a special preserve for other powers. The second key idea: a rejection of the anti-Soviet obsession, as the PSF believes that the USSR, "legalistic" in its interventions, is neither trying to create new conflicts nor to stir up old ones. At least it is not trying to get more than long-term "anchorage points" on Africa's coasts.

Third key idea: some African states are on the way to becoming "regional powers." In North Africa, Libyan expansionism is considered a serious threat, while Algeria's positive role is recognized. In black Africa, Nigeria is urged to claim a predominant position, as to a much lesser extent are Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Tanzania.

Fourth key idea: French cooperation must be extended, particularly to the Front Line countries, and it must become more selective in the future by eliminating aid to notoriously dictatorial regimes.

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From all this analysis, notable for its soundness, one can only draw the conclusion that Mitterrand will remove the French umbrella under which a number of African leaders sheltered themselves the better to exercise their absolute power, on the pretext of denying access to the Soviet Union.

The African continent is at the present time embarked on a phase of change, still underneath the surface, which may be fecund but whose extremely varied manifestations have but a single common point: they are responding to, and at the same time accelerating, the disintegration of most of the statal institutions which resulted from decolonization. This decomposition is not simply the result of the inadequacy of certain leaders, nor of foreign economic and political domination. But this shift in the foundations may be perverted by the manipulations of outside powers.

Very simple in its broad lines, the policy of the former colonial powers, and especially France, was to maintain the status quo, whatever it was, without paying too much attention to ideological facades, so far as there were any, and to preserve the benefits they enjoyed along with the essential mechanisms for economic domination. The United States, which in the 1950's seemed to want to hasten decolonization for its own benefit, was in reality not very involved in the whole process, except for investing in several countries where operations were profitable (particularly in southern Africa) and giving strong support to a few regimes judged to be of strategic importance, such as Kenyatta's Kenya, Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, and the Portuguese colonial system.

This being the case, we have contributed to keeping injustice alive and maintaining hotbeds for major explosions, southern Africa and Ethiopia in particular, while on the other hand we have provoked or accelerated a process of general political disintegration.

The drought in Ethiopia, the fall of the conservative Portuguese regime, were enough to considerably alter the balance of power on the continent, but the establishment of zones of Soviet preponderance was not an inevitable consequence of these important events: the new leaders of Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola only agreed to accept it under the pressure of circumstances; it was the gross blunders, or the cowardice, of the Western powers that in large part led to it.

Soviet Legalism

It must be admitted that Soviet policy in Africa has been distinguished by its legalism: the USSR has never supported secessionist or rebel movements (except, and one could hardly criticize it for this, in southern Africa), and it has collaborated with the most diverse regimes. While Soviet policy may not thus have created open conflicts on the continent, it has hardly contributed to resolving those which already existed: it could doubtless have hastened the fall of Ian Smith's regime, but did not try, even though it would have been as simple as destabilizing the chrome market; as a big gold-producing country, it could also, doubtless, have created more problems for South Africa.

In the military support it has provided, it has often appeared cautious. Even in Eritrea, where it has provided powerful support to the Ethiopian military, it is not certain that it is aiming for the most rapid possible elimination of the liberation movements.

Not to hasten either the appearance of violent conflicts or the resolution of those which have already broken out seems to be a rule for the Soviets. They aim more to assure themselves,--both in peaceful situations and in conflicts--of anchorage points which will be fully utilized whenever the evolution of social forces and the exacerbation of tensions on the continent or elsewhere makes them truly operational and necessary. In the present situation, /Soviet influence appears to be complete only in a few countries where it is not seriously or honestly rivalled;/ that influence is not, however, in any way irreversible, as is shown by the evolution of Egypt and Somalia.

New Force of Islam

Another spectacular change is the growing weight of the Muslim countries of North Africa and the Middle East on sub-Saharan Africa. Economically, it results from the actions taken by almost all the oil-producing countries, who among themselves carry out a subtle struggle for influence which manifests itself particularly in the Sudan-Sahel states, where Islam is strongly established. Culturally, it has gained new prestige because of its status as a non-colonial civilization, and because of its new oil wealth. Politically, it seems to boil down to a contest between the countries of the Maghreb--Morocco, Algeria, and Libya--the object of which is influence on the Sahara, which is apt to become once again what it was in the Middle Ages, a connecting link between the two halves of the continent. The Saharan-Morocco conflict, like the war in Chad, has brought new life to the old roads crossing the desert. They have also brought the ominous threat of a new predominance of the continent's northern countries.

Incontestably, the greatest anxiety is caused by Libya's presence in sub-Saharan Africa. Its intervention in Chad, and even more the proposed merger between the two states, has given rise to a vigorous move by the governments concerned, which feel themselves directly threatened, to condemn the actions taken.

Finally, one must take into account an additional factor involved in the evolution of disparities between countries, in their economic weight and their political influence. Today we see the assertion of influence by Nigeria, the most populous by far of the countries in tropical Africa, and also the most wealthy. No other state has the resources to exert influence at the continental level, but on a local scale, those which are experiencing fewer problems, or which enjoy political and ideological influence, may be exerting growing influence on their neighbors: this is the case with Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Tanzania, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. In a less tense context, this might be a positive factor for the creation of regional solidarities.

Long the private preserve of the former colonial powers, the African continent has thus today become open to influences which are much more varied and are broadly antagonistic. This has not, for the time being, provoked a major crisis. Soviet penetration was not until recently a cause of excessive concern in the United States: for the United States, in fact, and particularly for a man like Andrew Young, the blunders of the Soviets and their inability to understand African

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societies, as well as the wealth of experience and influence of the Western countries, kept the situation fluid and did not make direct intervention by Washington necessary. One could therefore leave the former colonial powers, and particularly France, a pre-eminent role on the continent. We might for our own part add that the communist countries themselves certainly do not have a perfectly homogenous view of Africa's problems.

Cooperation With Peoples

But the increase in global tensions, then Reagan's accession to power, the interplay of local expansionist policies, have doubtless already more deeply changed the picture than yet appears. Other ambitions are being asserted, particularly with the renewal of United States' interest, which is heightened by the fact that the USSR--discreetly but not ineffectively--is showing its resolve to keep a close watch on the maritime routes all around the continent (naval facilities acquired in Angola and at Sao Tome, sought in Cape Verde). These ambitions will make themselves felt all the more because Africa is no longer a lethargic continent, but a zone from which, if something is not done quickly, a general crisis of very great scope--already manifest in Uganda, Chad, and Zaire--is going to emerge. The general indications are not lacking: stagnation of agricultural production, and in certain very remote regions, almost general food shortfalls, extreme weakness in the growth pace of industrial production, catastrophic indebtedness tied to trade balances whose deficit appears irreparable (the consequence of the increasing weight of oil import costs and the fall of export commodity prices). Fragile from the start, the states now lack the minimum of resources essential to management and control of their territory.

Alas, it is all too easy to paint a very somber picture of the situation in a number of countries 10 years from now: most of the territory will become once again a "tribal reserve," left to itself, feeding manpower to the few growth centers, or at best destined to welcome tourists desperate for exoticism. With this as the foundation, the rapidly swollen cities and a few islets of imported "prosperity" will stand out with their occasional plantations or industrial plants, controlled at least indirectly by foreign powers. Indeed, because of the continually growing indebtedness, the latter will have an iron grip on the public finances and foreign trade: this is already the case for a country like Zaire, which is under the tutelage of the IMF. But this may also be the fate lying ahead for countries that depend on the communist bloc. Wearing different clothes, it will be the ultimate refinement to neocolonialism, or, if one prefers, the realization of one of the most economic forms of colonialism: indirect administration, or the protectorate.

One might try to define Giscard's strategy on the continent as political and economic conservatism, joined with a strategy of expansion beyond the traditional sphere of influence, facilitated for a time by the relative indifference of the other western powers. This policy can be defined in terms of a series of concentric arcs.

In the center, the "hard core," of the former colonial empire. Immediately beyond it is found a "greater French-speaking Africa," part of which may seem to be in the process of being absorbed into the previous zone. It includes the former Belgian colonies and both the isolated Portuguese-speaking and English-speaking enclaves. The cases of Nigeria and Ghana are less open and shut: these are "big mouthfuls" which do not let themselves be absorbed so easily.

Roughly speaking, it is possible to define the criteria for membership in both of these zones. The "central core" is defined by military intervention (and from this point of view Zaire, the largest French-speaking country in the world, already belongs in it), attempts at political manipulation (manipulation of the statesmen in power or attempts to destabilize regimes that are too independent). The second zone is defined by its participation in Franco-African conferences.

Beyond that, one finds Africa "incognita"--basically English-speaking--which is to be approached only with caution, not to say with trepidation (witness, for example the expectant attitude of the French Government in regard to Zimbabwe). In that respect we are still in the exploratory stage, particularly in the scientific field, and we are not yet ready to take spectacular initiatives.

Blunders and Scandalous Actions

Finally, there remains the unique case of South Africa. Contacts with Pretoria have not been significantly reduced; of course, Giscard was able to say that he respected the embargo on arms...since the granting of French licenses makes it possible for South Africa to make do for itself, but commercial and industrial relations are still solid. France is actively participating in the exploitation of Namibia's wealth, particularly uranium, in defiance of United Nations' resolutions.

In the context of Giscard's policy, the expansion of French influence beyond its special sphere, in other words toward countries that are often extremely wealthy, is inseparable from an extreme conservatism with respect to the central core. It is in fact a question of assuring political stability, or rather of providing complacent leaders with a sort of "life insurance," albeit at the cost of continual intervention. If we are to judge on the basis (certainly debatable) of the stability of leaders (which does not necessarily mean political stability), instability in francophone Africa has been twice as great as in English-speaking Africa, whereas Great Britain intervened only twice in Africa, following the granting of independence to Tanzania and Kenya, to put down revolts with soldiers.

Relations With Pretoria

French intervention has only rarely (Gabon) had the effect of keeping a head of state in power; often the aim has been (as in Central Africa) to replace him with someone else, and we are not even counting the clandestine destabilizing moves in the Comoros and Benin, of which it could not have been unaware, and thus encouraged. The majority of French interventions aimed at dealing with almost hopeless situations, at the origin of which, in various ways, lay considerable French culpability: the ill-considered, even scandalous support of Bokassa, the Chadian imbroglio which in large part is the result of the complacent attitude toward Tombalbaye, followed by the establishment, with the Elysee's blessing, of an incompetent military regime; the "salvage" of Mauritania, which was thrust into a war by French refusal to recognize the rights of the Saharan people. The two French interventions in Zaire resulted from a more complex situation, where more states were compromised, but in two respects French responsibility is apparent; in the encouragement given to the Angolan trouble-makers, and in the continuing support of the Mobutu regime in its most scandalous aspects. The foundations of Giscard's policy are the following axioms: /the weaker a state, the stronger France is within it; the poorer a state, the less costly it is to maintain it under our influence.

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A scandalous policy, contemptuous of the right of peoples to peace and development, which sets at naught the courageous efforts of our cooperators, which makes our economic aid--already too parsimoniously measured out and poorly directed--meaningless.

France sets aside for aid to the poorest countries in Africa 0.02 percent of its GNP! A policy which basically is intended to keep a certain number of African governments in a state of vassalage.

However clumsy and scandalous the actions of the French Government, the other powers scarcely do any better: the USSR, for example, shows itself just as hegemonistic and anxious about its own interests, and it only provides extremely limited economic assistance.

Above all, the weakness of the African states is such that they must compromise wisely. They themselves trade too much (often by necessity) with South Africa to be able to call themselves very particular; indeed, they would certainly like France to take a different position, but they must accommodate themselves to France's policy. They disapprove of French intervention in Central Africa because of its modalities, but because they were unable to propose an alternative solution, they had to accept it. France has been a cynical player, not always a clumsy one. Interventionism in the central core and more selective expansion beyond it are two elements in a concerted policy.

Too much history, too many friendships, too many common interests, a different conception of France's place in the world, and simple honor require us to build a different French policy in Africa, with constant dialogue with the Africans themselves.

Progressively more anemic, more and more ineffective and mercantile, France's contribution to the survival, first, and then the development of Africa needs a profound reassessment. What we call cooperation is only one element, albeit an important one, and its functioning needs to be completely recast. It is not a question of using it cold-bloodedly to acquire or maintain "influence," that is to say to satisfy short-term political interests, or to consolidate already acquired and often questionable economic benefits. The cooperative efforts carried out by France (and cooperation in Africa is only a special case) should have two functions. First, to engage the participation of all the creative forces of the country, regardless of the social level where they may be found, in the struggle against want on a continent with which we have many longstanding ties. Second, to establish, within a more manageable short-term context, bilateral relations--or, to the degree possible, relations between the EEC and the associated countries--and new types of relations which prefigure what might become a new international economic order.

For the concept of cooperation by itself, a partial remedy but not a definitive solution, must be transcended, and a leftist government has a duty to struggle actively for the establishment of more equitable relationships on a global scale; this is particularly crucial for a continent which contains almost all of the poorest countries in the world.

Improvement or Neocolonialism

It is indispensable to build our relations on the African continent on a broader spectrum. Determined support for the Front Line countries is politically essential. That does not in any way mean that France should repudiate its special responsibilities toward countries which for nearly three-quarters of a century have been intimately associated with its history, countries which share with France not only the use of the same language for communication, but many ways of experiencing and evaluating the world that go along with it. By increasing its aid to the level of 0.7 percent of its GNP, excluding the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments-Overseas Territories] (compared to the current 0.3 percent), France would have the means to help other countries without abandoning traditional ties.

The possibilities will be wide open. But we would have to exclude from the start both racist regimes (primarily South Africa) and those in which violation of human rights constitutes a sort of governing principle. Unfortunately, of course, as in many other parts of the world, human rights are lightly dismissed in a number of African countries, and on the question of respecting them we have no intention of compromising; but, in a word, there are few countries where the attack on these principles reaches such a level that state-to-state cooperative relations--and even more especially, cooperative relations not just with the leaders, but with the people--are made impossible because they are categorically distorted for other ends.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

A LOOK AT MITTERRAND'S AFRICAN ADVISERS

Mitterrand's African Advisers Profiled

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 2 Jun 81 pp 18-21

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado]

[Text] The ministerial embraces will not feel the same! Only yesterday, Minister of Cooperation Robert Galley was effusively falling into the arms of his foreign affairs counterparts such as Moustapha Niake of Senegal, Simeon Ake of the Ivory Coast or Martin Bongo of Gabon.

Since 22 May, somebody else is in charge and, from now on, the Ministry of Cooperation and Development will have as its boss a 44-year old "young man," Jean-Pierre Cot, and it will take him a while to get used to this kind of effusive manners and to know which partners he should embrace two, three or four times. Unless he never gets used to it!

Although he has a warm personality, is known to be a "nice guy" and a "man who likes to make contact with people" and who rejects the label of technocrat, he does not have toward Africa that "gut feeling" which his predecessor claimed to have. From the viewpoint of physical appearances, Robert Galley was famous for his three-piece double-breasted suits while Cot will be known for sporting blazers. With a youthful face, long and curly hair casually groomed, this professor of international law from the University of Paris will be "the voice of France" during negotiations with African countries.

The Ministry of Cooperation continues to exist but its style will be different. And its spirit will also be different. The ministry would have ceased to exist long ago but for the insistence of the senior Senegalese head of state, Leopold Sedar Senghor, who again pointed out to President Mitterrand that he should not "frighten" some African leaders by giving the impression that he was going to do away with French-African cooperation.

Little known in Africa but vitally important for many African regimes since it handles French-African relations, that ministry located on "Rue Monsieur" was seen by some as the successor of the "Rue Oudinot" ministry, the former Ministry of overseas France. Others, in a more prosaic vein, saw it as the keeper of the keys to the French money chests--the FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund) and the CCCE (Central Fund for Economic Cooperation).

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The "African Paper" of the Socialist Party (see JEUNE AFRIQUE issues Nos 1062 and 1063) indicated that the ministry would be replaced by a National Agency for Cooperation similar to the ACDI (Canadian Agency for International Development). But mapping out a policy is one thing while governing is something else if one takes into account, as in this case, the reactions of foreign partners.

Yet, why was a minister who knows nothing about Africa selected to such an "African" post?

The first reason is past experience. In 1950-1951 when Francois Mitterrand took over the Ministry of overseas France, he had no insight about Africa. When Gaston Defferre, now minister of interior, took over the Rue Oudinot Ministry in 1956-1957, he could not claim to have that kind of insight either.

And, under the Fifth Republic, Robert Galley practically discovered Africa when he became minister of cooperation. A man such as Jean-Pierre Cot can go through the same apprenticeship even if he follows a different course.

A second reason: Francois Mitterrand has wanted to strike a balance in his government team between the various trends within the Socialist Party. Jean-Pierre Cot, who is the right-hand man of Michel Rocard, appointed to the post of minister of state in charge of planning and of territorial planning, will contribute to represent the Rocard group in the government.

And finally, a third reason: President Mitterrand undoubtedly wants to break away from the past by appointing to the Ministry of Cooperation a man who is not an offspring of the colonial seraglio. However, such men exist in the new French government team.

The French president himself knew Africa during the dark years of the continent. At that time, he opposed the arrest of Felix Houphouet-Boigny, then leader of the RDA (African Democratic Rally) and, as such, hounded as a rebel. With skillful moves, he became the architect of the divorce between that important African party and the French Communist Party.

The number two "Africa hand" is Gaston Defferre who, during the 1956-1957 period, moulded French-speaking Africa as we know it today by means of the famous outline law. The change introduced by that law was to grant internal autonomy to the colonial territories. But when he insists that this law was the first step toward decolonization, Defferre undoubtedly forgets that for many Africans it still represents a balkanization: the law carved up the large federations of the AOF (French West Africa) and of the AEF (French Equatorial Africa) into small territories which later became states.

In addition to the "Black Africa hands," the French Government also has its "Maghreb hands." One of them is Minister of National Education Alain Savary (age 63) who resigned in 1956 from the post of secretary of state for Moroccan and Tunisian affairs as an act of protest when the aircraft carrying the Algerian Revolution leader Ben Bella was searched in mid-flight.

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Another "Maghreb hand" is Michel Jobert, minister of state in charge of foreign trade. Born in Meknes, he is reputed to be one of the top French experts on Morocco. As such, his presence in the ranks of the government should counter-balance the friends which Algeria and the POLISARIO have among the members of the socialist team.

In addition to his Moroccan trump cards and to the high regard which the oil-producing Arab countries have for him, Michel Jobert has a wide experience going back to the newly-independent Black Africa. As principal private secretary of Gaston Cusin, then French high-commissioner for French West Africa in Dakar (1956-1958), he had to implement the famous outline law; as assistant to the principal private secretary, and later principal private secretary (1959-1961) of the minister of state in charge of cooperation, Robert Lecourt, he was the one who tested the first "noncolonial" relations between France and French-speaking Africa.

But if anybody deserves the title of "Mister Third World," it is Claude Cheysson, the minister of foreign affairs. Apart from his Vietnamese experience, this career diplomat has been an adviser to Pierre Mendes-France (for foreign affairs) and to Alain Savary (for Moroccan and Tunisian affairs). From 1958 to 1962, he headed the General Secretariat for Technical Cooperation with Africa, then became director general of the Sahara Organization--that unfulfilled dream of a Sahara shared by all the Maghreb countries--and was later put in charge of the Organization for Industrial Cooperation in Algiers.

After serving as ambassador to Indonesia (1966-1969), Claude Cheysson went back to the object of his early love. As a member of the EEC Commission since 1973, he became commissioner for development and was the architect of the two Lome Conventions (signed on 28 February 1975 and 31 October 1979 respectively) which regulate the cooperation between the nine Common Market countries and the 56 ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries.

Thus, Claude Cheysson has emerged as the "Mister Third World" and this is how he is viewed by a number of African leaders whose confidant he has become, if reluctantly. Cheysson is, without doubt, the minister who has been in the closest and best position to follow and even participate in African developments over the last 10 years. From now on, as boss of French diplomacy, he will be in control of France's policy in Africa.

Still, he will not be the only person in charge of the African file in Paris. Jean-Pierre Cot, his minister delegate in charge of cooperation and development, will share this task with him. As the Socialist Party's national representative for European affairs, Cot established an excellent relationship with Claude Cheysson when the latter was posted in Brussels.

To compensate for his lack of knowledge on African affairs, he has already selected experienced aides. The first is Jean Audibert, his principal private secretary, a former director of the FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund), then director of cultural and technical cooperation and, finally, chairman of the ASECNA (Association for Air Navigation Safety in Africa). All along, Audibert has been one of the main organizers of the Socialist Party's Africa Group.

Then there is Renauld Vignal, head of mission. Until his latest appointment, this career diplomat worked on the "North-South" file in the department of economic affairs of the Quai d'Orsay and he is known to have established a good relationship with the American liberal team of Jimmy Carter, particularly with Andrew Young whose militant humanism he shares.

That same humanism is a characteristic of the last and most unexpected "Africa hand," Jean Le Garrec, secretary of state to the prime minister. Without specific portfolio, Jean Le Garrec is reported to be the right-hand man of Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy. But even more important, as far as the Africans are concerned, is the fact that this 52-year old man spent his career in the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] union and in the Socialist Party defending the rights of immigrant workers in France.

There is little doubt that Jean Le Garrec will be "Minister Immigrant" but with a slight difference: from now on, they will not be referred to as "immigrant workers" but as "immigrant population." The reason for this change is that socialist France does not want to look upon foreigners as mere bunker-hands of the French economy. A symbolic nuance, no doubt, but a nuance which signals a frame of mind--human warmth and respect for mankind.

In this respect, one could even say that, from now on, those Africans who are having human right troubles will be likely to find a more receptive ear in the French Government. The Mitterrand team is full of "human rights" champions" and for a long time now they have been demanding that moral standards be applied to French-African relations.

They are even advocating cooperation on a selective basis depending on whether human rights are observed or disregarded by the recipient nations. When Claude Cheysson was drafting the Second Lome Convention, he suggested that the preamble to the treaty include a reference to human rights. He failed in this point to the delight of many African governments.

The present minister of state in charge of research and technology, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, set the cat among the pigeons when, in 1979, he questioned the government of Valery Giscard d'Estaing on the issue of its African policy which, at that time, was at least suspected of being in silent collusion with the despots of Africa. Francois Mitterrand himself stands as a champion of these famous human rights. Although he was rather discreet on the subject of the past friendship between Giscard d'Estaing and Bokassa, there have been times when he has refused to be associated with some undesirable individuals.

A few months ago, while he was on a trip to the Ivory Coast, he did not visit a member of his family who lives in a neighboring country, to avoid finding himself in a situation where he would have to shake hands with a president who is known to be following on the footsteps of someone like Bokassa.

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African Experts in Socialist Party

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 2 Jun 81 pp 20, 21

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado]

[Text] On the fourth floor of 10 Solferino Street, Paris, at the Socialist Party [PS] headquarters, four telephones are ringing nonstop in one of the offices assigned to the National Secretariat for International Affairs. From the time that Francois Mitterrand was elected and until a government was formed, telephone calls and unexpected visitors turned that office into a kind of hidden Foreign Affairs Ministry.

One day, Francois Fugier, who is in charge of the "Third World desk," took a call from Caracas. The caller was the French ambassador to Venezuela requesting instructions. She kindly advised him to approach the Quai d'Orsay where Giscard d'Estaing's minister, Jean Francois-Poncet, was still dealing with everyday matters. Another time, a special envoy from President Ahmed Sekou Toure came to that office to assure the "French socialist comrades" of the joy felt by the "Guinean revolutionary comrade on the occasion of Francois Mitterrand's splendid election to the post of president of French-speaking Africa at the EHESS (School of Advanced Studies on Social Sciences); Gabriel Arnaud, in charge of external relations in the CCFD (Catholic Committee Against Hunger and for Development) who "is very knowledgeable" on the subject of southern Africa; Jean Audibert, chairman of ASECNA (Association for Air Navigation Safety in Africa) who is reputed to be one of the top French experts on Chad and generally on all the countries in the Sudanese area; Roland Colin, director general of IRFED (Institute for Research and Training in Education and Development) and former chief private secretary of Mamadou Dia, president of the Senegalese Council until 1962, and who "deals" not only with Senegal but with Mali, Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic as well.

That inner core is surrounded by a second circle which consists of experts from various ministries and specialized agencies. There is, for instance, Andree Audibert, head of social services in the Ministry of Cooperation; Denis de Sevres, the driving spirit behind the magazine RECHERCHE ET PEDAGOGIF, who has been put in charge of the "French-speaking countries" file by the PS; Yves Person, a historian who is the director of the African Research Center; Georges Cancade from the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation and Claude Wauthier, a journalist working for AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE.

Finally, the last circle is a sort of semi-clandestine network of "friends"--some are party activists, others are not; some are French citizens, others are not--who have also contributed to the mapping out of the PS's African policy (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, issues Nos. 1062 and 1063) by preparing background notes or supplying....some confidential documents.

The same as all those who are in the National Secretariat for International Relations, the members of the Africa Group have a reputation of being "travel junkies." This unkind reputation came to them as an inheritance from some of their predecessors who were said to love traveling. Another label attached to

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the "African experts of the party" is that of being "young Turk ideologists." In fact, and apart from Veronique Neiertz and Francoise Fugier, all the members of the International Commission are over 40. Philippe Farine, who is over 60 and a retiree, could even be taken for an old man if he did not have such a strong physical appearance. Jean-Tierre Raison (age 45) separates the rest of them into two categories: "Those who go back to the colonial years like Gabriel Arnaud, Roland Colin or Jean Audibert, and the Algerian war generation to which I belong."

How much weight do these "African experts" carry within the party? A lot considering that they are also known to be Lionel Jospin's proteges. But how much weight will they carry from now on in a France ruled by socialists? Discreet or bitter in advance, their only answer is to say that the party is not the government and that the PS program is not necessarily the same as President Mitterrand's program. This is perhaps their way of saying that Francois Mitterrand will not feel tied down to every program although the party commissions will act as watchdog committees of the government.

But, at least, the "African experts" of Solferino Street have had a first satisfaction: as they recommended, the French-African Summit Meeting of Kinshasa, scheduled to be held in September this year, will not take place. Firstly, because one must find out what is the point of that tradition established by Giscard d'Estaing. And secondly, because Francois Mitterrand wants to be free to choose the first African country that he will visit.

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POLITICAL

UNITED KINGDOM

USSR, PRC REPRESENTATIVES INVITED TO LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCE

PM301320 London THE TIMES in English 30 Jun 81 p 1

[Report by Julian Haviland: "Labour Invites Russians and Chinese"]

[Text] For the first time, representatives of the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and China are to be invited as official observers to the annual conference of the Labour Party in Brighton next September.

The decision by Labour's National Executive Committee last week has aroused misgivings among some Labour MPs and party members.

One member of the NEC, Mr Eric Heffer, objected to any communists being invited. But in the end he agreed on condition that representatives of five or six dissident groups from the Soviet Union and eastern Europe should also be invited. That was agreed.

Senior Labour Party figures expressed regret last night that the party should be showing the Soviet Communist Party, in particular, this mark of favour. But there is a strong group, believed to include Mr Michael Foot, the leader, who hold that such contacts with the Soviet block can only help detente.

Eastern European Communist parties, were first invited in 1975 to send observers, on the ground that by listening to conference debates they would learn how true democracy works. But the Soviet and Czechoslovak parties were excluded, because of their treatment of dissidents.

When Labour's international committee met early this month to approve the list of invited observers, Mr Eric Clarke, of the National Union of Mineworkers, suggested that Asia was under-represented, and that the Chinese party should be asked.

Mr Frank Allaun, MP for Salford East, said that if the Chinese came, the Soviet party could hardly be left out.

Mr Heffer objected strongly to the Russians. Indeed, he did not want any eastern European parties asked. If they were to have communists, then let them invite representatives of western European Communist parties, who had shown some independence and been willing to criticize the Soviet Union.

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In the end it was agreed that the invitation would go out, but balanced by invitations to dissidents in good standing with the socialist international. A list of dissidents is due to be approved by the international committee next week.

There was further argument over the Czech party because of its treatment of the dissident group Charter 77. However, the Czech party was said last night to be on the official list.

When the international committee's invitation list came to the full NEC last Wednesday it was approved without discussion. There is some interest now at Labour Party headquarters in seeing if the invitations are accepted. There seems little doubt that the Russians will come: they have been looking for such an invitation for years.

Their photographs will no doubt be prominently displayed in the press, to the chagrin of some party members who were saying last night that they hoped Mr Alex Kitson, the party chairman, would not welcome them too warmly from the platform.

Because the Russians will come it is generally assumed that the Chinese will decline.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

REVIEW OF ARMY CORPS ARTILLERY'S EQUIPMENT, OPERATIONS

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURDHUI in French Jun 81 pp 28-30

[Article by Gen Jean-Francois Barbotin]

[Text] Created with the reorganization of the ground forces, and consisting of some 10 units organized as a self-contained body, the Army Corps Artillery [ACA] not only provides the army corps [AC] commanding general the capability of instant artillery intervention throughout his zone of action but also provides him with a decisive interventional component.

--8,000 men, including 450 officers and 1,400 noncommissioned officers.

--2,000 vehicles, of which 150 are armored.

--Some 100 missile launchers and as many artillery pieces of all calibers.

These figures give an idea of the size of an ACA.

Possessing its own entity as an EOCA [army corps organic component], this virtual "artillery division" represents, in the hands of the AC commanding general, an instrument of choice that enables him to back his operational effort with fire-power.

It is nevertheless not a widely known body and sometimes a misunderstood one despite articles that have already been published regarding it.

* A graduate of Saint-Cyr (class of Leclerc), and holder of a technical certificate and an EMS [National War College] certificate, Gen Jean-Francois Barbotin has held successively the posts of chief of the Ground-to-Ground Artillery section, Research Department, EMAT [Ground Forces General Staff]; commanding officer of the 8th RA [Artillery Regiment]; advocate general of the CHEM [Advanced Military Studies Center] and of the IHEDN [Institute for High National Defense Studies]; then chief of the General Studies Bureau of the EMAT. Currently, he is deputy to the commanding general of 2nd Army Corps Artillery.

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It therefore seems of interest, as part of this ongoing reporting that is being devoted to artillery, to review the ACA type organization, and then to discuss in turn the problems posed by the existence of this "major unit" in peace time, its capabilities, its purposes and its use in case of conflict.

A Diversified Artillery...

The artilleries of the 1st and 2nd AC's are of substantially similar makeup and of the same size. That of the 3rd AC is smaller but is capable of being stacked with additional units in time of war, in accordance with the mission assigned to this entity and with the general deployment of our forces.

Each ACA is commanded by a general officer who is at the same time the artillery deputy of the AC commanding general.

The ACA commanding general is assisted by a deputy commanding general and by two colonels charged respectively with the use and the maneuvering of its ground-ground and its ground-air artilleries. He has a headquarters staff of some 20 officers.

Each ACA contains the following 10 or so units operating as an entity:

- one headquarters squadron;
- two nuclear artillery regiments equipped with Pluton missiles;
- one nuclear artillery support group belonging to the Ordnance Corps;
- two or three ground-ground artillery regiments;
- one medium-range ground-air artillery regiment;
- two short-range ground-air artillery regiments;
- one surveillance and acquisition regiment.

Coupled with this diversification of units is a wide geographical dispersion. The regiments are often separated by long distances from each other and from the ACA command post [CP] and sometimes stationed in different military regions.

Under these conditions: How is the necessary cohesion to be maintained? How are the activities of all these units to be directed and monitored, given their common mission in time of war? How is the presence of the commanding general to be made felt down to the lowest echelons? These are the problems with which the commanding general of an ACA must deal in time of peace.

...That Must Be Made Fully Cohesive

To exercise his authority and achieve the cohesion of this entity, the ACA commanding general functions in three major capacities:

--He is the deputy for artillery to the AC commanding general;

--He exercises, with respect to all ACA formations, the responsibilities normally assigned to a commander of troops;

--He is "manager of delegated authority" with regard to the operations budget.

As the AC commanding general's deputy for artillery, he is charged with the responsibility, from peace time on, for coordinating specialized training and overseeing the application of the technical and operating regulations by all the AC's artillery units, including those organic to divisions.

His responsibilities are substantially the same with respect to ground-ground and ground-air artillery. With regard to nuclear artillery, he moreover assumes personally the conducting of annual tests and of certain specific exercises.

As commander of troops, he is vested with authorized powers with respect to ratings and discipline at the command echelon immediately above that of the unit commander.

Lastly, with respect to the operations budget, he is delegated to head:

--the study and the drawing up of unit plans,

--the overseeing of program progress during the current year,

--the followup monitoring of budget performance.

The ACA commanding general is thus equipped with the means for training his "division" in accordance with its war time mission, for affixing his personal imprint to it, and for making it a coherent instrument.

This of course means, both for him and for his deputies and staff officers, many visits to the field and to the firing ranges, as well as many personal contacts and participation in exercises. It is a price that must be paid to achieve overall operational efficiency.

A Wide-Ranging Flexibility of Use

It is obviously in time of war, however, that the ACA takes on its true scope in fulfilling the AC commanding general's firepower and informational needs.

At this level of operations, air and ground maneuvers are integrated into an overall operation combining firepower and movement. But although these two components are complementary, artillery remains the essential element.

For the ground-ground artillery, the AC, with its organic regiments and its reinforcement, as required, with general reserve or mobilization units, remains the privileged level of artillery maneuvering.

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This maneuverability must not be thought of in terms of current weapons but rather in terms of future systems--155 Au F-1 or 155 Tr F-1--with which our units will shortly be equipped.

Whereas the division commander's concerns are centered primarily on the zone of contact and are conducive to his use of division artillery primarily with priority on direct operational support, the AC commander's more distant perspective and view of operations as a whole require that he, on the other hand, place his emphasis on artillery operations at that echelon.

The new weapons--because of their ranges, the flexibility of their trajectories, their precision, their power, and the instantaneousness of their interventional effects--will again make such operations possible. They will enable the AC commanding general to bring artillery operations effects to bear throughout his zone of action and to intervene in depth against enemy emplacements.

Furthermore, the unitary nature of the battle, the variety of forms of combat, and the rapidity of situational developments militate against a strict differentiation of missions between ACA and division artillery.

From this standpoint, the AC commanding general--without encroaching upon the prerogatives of the division commanding generals and while preserving a two-level overall artillery organization--must be in a position to order:

--artillery reinforcements of divisions by ACA units,

--a maximum concentration of firepower on a given major objective with the possible participation of division artilleries,

--mutual artillery support between divisions if needed.

The use of ground-ground ACA in time of war derives from these imperatives.

It is maneuvered from its operations CP (PC MANART de l'ACA [ACA Artillery Maneuvers CP]) via an artillery coordination network that links all ACA units including the division artillery units.

As the only command echelon with specific artillery weapons and the means of coordination with the planes of the "third dimension," the AC is responsible for the antiaircraft defense of the zone above its area of deployment.

Its ground-air artillery helps guarantee the freedom of action of the AC's major units, by conducting an overall defense action if possible and, at the very least, a concentrated defense of priority zones.

As in the case of ground-ground artillery, it is the responsibility of the AC commanding general, at the request of the ACA commanding general, to set the priorities and to order the deployment best suited to the ground-air defense of his zone of responsibility.

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As currently structured or being structured, the AC includes:

--one Hawk-equipped regiment;

--two regiments equipped with Roland and 30-mm twin gun turrets.

The Hawk is the backbone of the AC's entire antiaircraft defense system, but the Roland and the 30-mm double gun are indispensable components at low and very low altitudes:

--to extend Hawk action forward to division levels,

--to defend vital zones, with priority being given to those covered by the Hawk.

Roland, by virtue of its operational characteristics and its tactical mobility, can be:

--adapted to use by major units; in this case, it defends forward-based armored regiments, which is the purpose for which it was designed;

--used for the defense of sensitive zones designated by AC.

The 30-mm twin gun is used to defend specific sensitive points, route sections, obligatory crossing points...

This artillery is maneuvered from the Ground-Air Artillery Maneuvers CP in accordance with orders received from the Third-dimensional Section of the AC CP.

Lastly, the AC is the echelon responsible for ordering into operation the tactical nuclear weapons of the Pluton regiments.

The decision to use these weapons is made by the head of state and the coordination of their use with that of the air-ground nuclear weapons is handled at the FATAAC [Tactical Air Force]-Army headquarters level.

But it devolves upon the AC commanding general to order and to follow in minutest detail the maneuvers of the Pluton regiments so that the latter will at all times be in a position to respond in the shortest time possible to orders from the head of state committing them to action.

As a deterrent weapon, its use is intended to be a last and solemn warning to the aggressor that the nature of the battle has changed. But the more effective the military use of the tactical nuclear weapon is made, the more effectively will its political intent be attained.

From this standpoint, the AC's operation must be conducted in accordance with the following imperative: to be at all times in a position to:

--locate the targets suited to treatment by nuclear fire,

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--carry out the firing immediately following the governmental decision,

--take full advantage of the pause imposed on the enemy by the strike to commit its fighting forces.

This demands coordination of all the AC's forces and in particular a tight integration of the operations of the Pluton regiments. These operations are directed by the Nuclear Artillery Section of the AC.

Far-Sight for More Effective Intervention

This article would not be complete without mentioning the acquisition artillery, whose role will become more and more determinative as higher-performance means become available to it for providing useful information to the Maneuvers CP and targets to the artillery.

This is what it will take to enable our ACA to adequately fulfill its three traditional missions:

--participation in the conquest of artillery superiority,

--support of interservices units or groups by intervening on targets beyond the range of their organic weapons,

--disruption of the enemy's deployment in depth by artillery operations coordinated with the commitment of mobile forces.

The ACA, a virtual "artillery division" totally oriented toward a single purpose--to intervene effectively in the air-ground battle with the object of upsetting the local balance to the advantage of our forces--is a coherent whole and an indispensable AC combat instrument.

Its seeming heterogeneity, sometimes commented by ill-informed observers, stems from the diversity of its weapons and equipment rather than from the state of mind of those who are part of it.

Whatever it may be tomorrow, it will, with its new weapons and equipment, be the indispensable instrument for responding to the AC's artillery and information needs.

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MILITARY

ITALY

MELARA CLUB INVOLVEMENT IN ARMS TRADE

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 19 Jun 81 pp 78-79, 115

[Article: "The Cannon Club"]

[Text] It is called the Melara Club. It has no clubhouse. The members meet from time to time at a restaurant table or in the office of one of them. It has a president, Gustavo Stefanini, who is also president of Oto Melara, but his is not a real post just as there is no leadership of some group or other. It is a formula rather than a structure, derived from the idea of eight or nine companies, private and public, large and medium-sized, to associate informally, in order to sell on the international markets absolutely complete turnkey military naval units, provided with all the necessary equipment, finished in detail.

Alongside the Melara Club, there is another organization that has played a determining part in the amazing affirmation of Italian industry on this difficult market. It is a question of EPIN [Naval Defense Industry Promotion Agency], headed by Enrico Bocchini, president of United Shipbuilding Yards. The agency, which was established 6-7 years ago, has among its main productions the Genoa naval show, which exhibits Italy's total production for defense at sea every 2 years in the fair pavilions of the capital of Liguria.

In spite of the fact that it arrived last with regard to the other exhibitions by the sector held in France and Great Britain and is only in its third edition (1980), the Genoa naval exhibition has already attained, if not surpassed in some cases, the level of the most important foreign exhibitions. A prominent part in the commercial development policy of military shipbuilding is recognized to EPIN, which, among other things, is supported by a special interministerial committee. And, in this connection, it is recalled how, in the wake of the success of the 1978 naval show, Italian industry was able to acquire sizable orders from Ecuador (six corvettes), Thailand (three corvettes) and Iraq (four Lupo-class frigates, six corvettes, a logistics unit).

Genoese and Ligurian industry has a leading role in military shipbuilding, as well as in the production of precision weapons and electrical and electronic systems. Of the limited number of companies belonging to the Melara Club (Oto Melara, United Shipbuilding Yards, ELSAG [San Giorgio Electronics], Large Motors, FIAT, Breda machinery in Brescia, Selenia and ELMER [division of Montedel]), the first three have their headquarters and production units in the region. But the number of enterprises, even small- and medium-sized, operating entirely or in part in this sector is quite larger. There are at least about 10 industries in the electrical machinery sector, about 20 in the shipbuilding sector.

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Among the largest companies, there is, first of all, United Shipbuilding Yards, in Genoa, which has concentrated production of military units in Liguria in the two Riva Trigoso and Muggiano shipyards, where about 3,300 persons are employed. In 1970, it was declared bankrupt and a committee, of which Enrico Bocchini, the present president of the company, was a member, among others, was appointed to handle its liquidation. In 1973, with the payment of 84 percent of the debts, it was possible to reach an agreement, but the shipyards had to start from scratch in a market situation that was anything but encouraging.

Interest in the military sector, in which Italian industry had practically no longer succeeded in being represented, and the understanding with the other industries in the sector that led to the establishment of the Melara Club date back to the middle of the 1970's. At present, in the sector of corvettes and frigates, the shipyards boast of an order portfolio of roughly 35 percent and 50 percent, respectively, of the world market. The latest order was placed only 3 months ago. It specifies furnishing of four Lupo-class frigates, six corvettes and a logistics unit for Iraq and probably represents, in value, the largest deal concluded abroad by Italian industry after acquisition of the Isfahan (formerly Bandar Abbas) iron and steel center, in Iran, by ITALIMPIANTI [Italian Industrial Plant Company].

The United Shipbuilding Yards component in construction of these ships will range around 30 percent. A sizable contribution is made then by Oto Melara and the electrical machinery industries, including ELSAG. The role of this contribution and, especially, of the Ligurian companies, is considerable. In the United Shipbuilding Yards, they estimate that about 40 percent of the outside costs that the company is incurring for these ships can be attributed to supplies from Ligurian companies in the sector.

Military shipbuilding, however, represents only part of the CNR [United Shipbuilding Yards] activities. The company, which is controlled by FINCANTIERI [Shipyards Finance Corporation] and employs a total of 11,000 persons, including also two other shipyards at Ancona and Palermo, controls a large ship repair center in Genoa, consisting of OARN [Ship Equipping and Repair Facilities], Grazie, MGN [expansion unknown], Dry Docks Corporation. This sector is precisely the one destined to have the greatest development in the company's programs.

Bocchini points out that "the military sector cannot be regarded as a miracle-making factor, because it is a limited market, affected by many factors and of which we already control a very large slice. Repairs are the priority objective. It is true that times are difficult at present. But, taking everything into account, the market is there and also quality. A few important things are missing. That group of factors called reliability is missing especially. Therefore, everyone must do his own part in this regard."

Oto Melara, in La Spezia, has a history similar in part to the history of the United Shipbuilding Yards and, like the CNR, it has developed especially in the last 10 years, becoming, under the guidance of Gustavo Stefanini, a company with a solid position on the international market, instead of merely an industry primarily supplying the Italian Navy and Army. At present, Oto (originally Odero Terni Orlando) provides employment for 2,500 persons, exports its naval products (missiles and guns of its own design and with sophisticated technology) and land products (tracked vehicles, cars and various types of heavy weapons) to 30 countries including the United States, Great Britain and Germany.

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The La Spezia company, which is a member of the EFIM [Manufacturing Industry Holding and Financial Company] and which will probably be joined shortly by another company in La Spezia, the TERMOMECCANICA [Thermal Machinery] company, has made considerable progress recently in the field of technological independence, especially in the sector of land weapons. After producing Leopard tanks under German license, Oto recently developed, in collaboration with FIAT, a tank of its own design, the OF-40. The objective is ambitious: to be ready to play an important card when, in a few years, the European NATO partners will sit at a table to decide the line of tanks to adopt for the 1990's.

ELSAG is a Genoese company established 12 years ago from the disincorporation of the new San Giorgio company. The company, a member of the IRI-STET [Industrial Reconstruction Institute - Telephone Finance Corporation] and which started off, in 1969, with 400 employees and a turnover of 2 billion lire and now employs 1,600 persons, achieved a turnover of 81 billion lire, in 1980, and an order portfolio amounting to 242 billion, at the end of the year, 22 percent of which came from abroad. ELSAG, a vigorous company with considerable production in the field of digital controls and processing and in postal mechanization, owes roughly 50 percent of its turnover to the naval systems sector.

Marconi, controlled by the British Marconi Company, also plays a considerable part in the military sector. It has a turnover of 60 billion lire and employs 1,000 persons. It operates primarily in the field of telecommunications and is divided into four divisions: civilian, military, avionics and systematics.

Selin, in Sestri Ponente, with 200 employees, also produces electrical and electronic parts. It is, however, a company that has decided recently on a partial re-conversion of its own activity in the civilian field.

Rinaldo Piaggio, in Genoa, one of Italy's oldest aeronautical industries, also has production intended for the military market. It is a question of the twin-engine P 166-DL 3, used in sea patrol, search and rescue. Finally, Gajon is a company in process of strong development. It specializes in supplying complete training systems to the Armed Forces and is capable also of directly providing training courses and services.

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